The Road Not Taken in Eastern Europe

The end game approaches in Eastern Europe. Russian troops are now poised on Ukraine’s borders and prepared to strike. That war is imminent is not altogether surprising. Some sort of conflict over Russia’s former sphere of influence was the inevitable result of the vacuum of power in the region.

The challenges of eastern European security after the Cold War were the same challenges that have plagued the region for centuries: a group of weaker states sandwiched between major powers and relegated to falling within the orbit of east or west – or being divided between them. The US had no novel solution for these challenges at the end of the Cold War – only the creeping advance of NATO to the east, a mere shift of eastern Europe from Russia’s sphere of influence to the western sphere of influence.

Faced with NATO’s advance, Putin – a realist and Russian nationalist – has now drawn the line at Ukraine. One can dismiss his demands for a sphere of influence to ensure Russian security as an atavism from the previous century, but self-awareness demands one acknowledge that the bedrock of US grand strategy, the Monroe Doctrine, is the exemplar of sphere of influence politics in action. Nor should we expect that western proclamations of peaceful intentions will carry any weight in Moscow. Like any prudent leader of a major power, Putin is focused on NATO’s capabilities rather than its self-ascribed good intentions. The gradual absorption of eastern Europe into the western fold was certain to stoke Russian fears, and the documented efforts by US officials to engineer a pro-western regime in Ukraine only added fuel to the fire.   

While there is no moral equivalence between providing Ukraine with the option to join western Europe’s institutions and Russia’s attempts to coerce them back into its orbit, the lack of moral equivalence does nothing to address the real security problems on the ground. Neither will western claims to the moral high ground lessen the number of body bags needed in Ukraine when the shooting starts.

The Road Not Taken

There was another option that the west could have pursued in eastern Europe after the Soviet collapse. Rather than roll NATO and the EU up to Russia’s borders, the US and its allies might have restrained their eastward expansion and instead actively promoted the economic and security integration of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states of eastern Europe into an independent alliance. Consider that in the aggregate the Baltics, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria have a population of approximately 140 million and GDP of about $1.5 trillion, compared to Russia’s population and GDP of roughly 146 million and $2.1 trillion, respectively. Combined, these European nations possess the capabilities to mount a credible deterrent against Russian aggression but are not so powerful to pose an alarming threat to Russia’s security.

The idea of an alliance among the nations of eastern and central Europe is not new. Polish statesman Jozef Piłsudski proposed just such a federation after the Great War with his idea for an Intermarium. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the nations of eastern and central Europe on their own initiative created a variety of regional structures for political, economic, and security cooperation, among them the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, the Three Seas Initiative, the Central European Defense Cooperation, the Committee of Democratic Choice, the Salzburg Forum, and the Bucharest Nine. Moreover, the more culturally conservative of these states have demonstrated their unwillingness to follow Brussels’ lead on cultural issues. Rather than multiply the existing challenges within the EU, or have NATO undertake new security obligations that will inevitably fall on the US to fulfill, the west should have been encouraging this regional cooperation among the eastern and central Europeans.

Alas, this sort of restrained realist strategy runs counter to the globalist logic that predominates in the salons and bureaucracies of Washington. The foreign policy Blob is only too happy to extend its suzerainty wherever it finds a willing client, or can manufacture one, without any real consideration of whether such commitments actually enhance the security of the American people or those countries in which it interferes. After all, when your overarching goal is to recreate the world in your own image, that sort of analysis only slows you down. Contrary to former President Clinton’s spin on the post-Soviet Partnership for Peace, it really was just about NATO expansion and drawing “another line dividing Europe a few hundred miles to the east.”

Naturally, despite their own efforts to promote regional cooperation, when given the chance to join NATO the eastern Europeans embraced the opportunity. Why reject a US security guarantee if you can get it? NATO’s resulting expansion undermined the opportunity to promote a new security architecture for eastern Europe, and it is unlikely another such opportunity will soon present itself, barring some profound changes in the European political environment.

Truth and Consequences

So, instead of standing within an Intermarium, eastern Europe now stands on the precipice of war. The ultimate consequences of a Russian invasion of Ukraine will depend on how the facts play out on the ground. Russia’s overwhelming firepower will bring early tactical victories, but what happens after? Are they able to rapidly consolidate their hold on Ukraine, or at least the eastern areas most easily absorbed by Russia? Or do they get bogged down in a long, expensive, and futile war of attrition?

If the former, then settle in for Cold War – Part II. If the latter, then there might be an opportunity for a negotiated settlement in which Ukraine is aligned with neither east nor west. This sort of settlement might in turn serve as a model for a broader regional security structure that encourages eastern Europe to take responsibility for its defense without an explicit dependence on NATO.

No doubt, the globalists would recoil at the suggestion that some part of the western-leaning world be permitted to take the lead in its own defense without explicitly answering to Washington. The Blob is so paranoid about not having the decisive voice at each and every table that allies of the US find it profitable to allow Washington to call the shots while they enjoy a unilateral security guarantee. Once the US has committed to defend them why should they make the necessary investments to fully defend themselves? But contrary to globalist ideology, building regional security structures to which the US is not explicitly committed is exactly the means by which the US can maximize the efficient use of its resources and political capital in pursuit of its own vital interests, including the faltering rate of its long-term economic growth. A more judicious presence on the global stage enhances US power rather than diminishing it.

Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, the unintended consequence of NATO expansion was to drive Russia closer to China in an unnatural alliance of two major powers that share a border and would otherwise be in competition with one another. While US policy pushes Russia closer to China, the US “pivot to Asia” to counter China’s pursuit of regional hegemony is driving China closer to Russia. That the growth of China’s economic, technological, and military power was substantially aided by US foreign economic policy would make the entire situation comical if it weren’t so tragic. All brought to you by the Blob – the Keystone Cops of US grand strategy.

Published by flyingatdusk

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